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Responsibility for long term policy for civil nuclear activity  
1. Responsibility for ensuring that the UK has a coherent and consistent long term policy for civil 
nuclear activities lies with Government and should continue to do so, to ensure that it remains focused 
on strategic national priorities but responsive to changing external drivers.  In developing policy, 
Government should ensure it is able to call on independent evidence based advice, as set out in 21-23, 
and continue to consult on major policy developments.  Co-ordination of activities and international 
collaboration in support of realising policy objectives should be undertaken by an independent 
advisory body (succeeding NIRAB) reporting to Government. 
Industrial strategy green paper  
2. The nuclear sector is well placed to benǲǳ
ǡ
through: long term investment and co-ordination of research and facilities development; boosting 
skills and high value jobs; and increasing commercialisation of research and export of technology, 
products, and intellectual property Ȃ particularly in nuclear decommissioning and waste management 
for which the global market is projected to be £50 billion per annum by 2020.1   
3. The reformed Nuclear Industry Council could be well placed to lead, consult on, and facilitate, the ǲǳ.  Key leadership organisations to be engaged would be 
those with relevant strategic advisory, regulatory, and executive responsibility, such as the National 
Skills Academy Nuclear, the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority and Office for Nuclear Regulation.    
Small modular reactors: benefits, disadvantages and risks for the UK, and more widely 
4. The primary potential benefit of SMR technology to the UK is the opportunity to design, 
demonstrate, licence, and manufacture, an indigenous reactor which would be of interest to the 
international market.  Production of SMR units in the UK would create high skill and high value 
employment and revenue.  The more affordable up front capital cost of SMRs would facilitate 
deployment, compared to large scale LWR reactors.  Potential disadvantages of SMR technology relate 
to the multiple smaller units required to produce a given generating capacity, which may lead to 
comparatively higher operating costs and lower fuel resource efficiency. 
5. Conceptually, future decommissioning of SMRs could be achieved at comparatively lower cost, if 
assisted by the modular nature of construction.  However, it is not apparent that this would achieve a 
net reduction in the quantity of associated radioactive waste, compared to conventional Gen3+ LWR 
systems, normalised to usable energy output.  Further research is required to assess this issue. 
6. The key risk to SMR deployment is that the capital, financing and operating costs of SMRs remain 
the subject of considerable uncertainty and commercial privilege.  Government commissioned 
research is addressing this knowledge gap, however, a lower levelised cost of electricity is not readily 
apparent.  The distribution of many SMR units and spent fuel storage facilities across multiple nuclear 
licensed sites, would pose enhanced risks of security, safeguards, and emergency planning. 
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Global market opportunity for SMRs 
7. A recent analysis estimated the global SMR market for electricity production to be 65-85 GW of 
installed capacity to 2035, with an undiscounted market value of £250-400bn.2  However, this 
opportunity should be consider with caution, because: i) there is fundamental uncertainty concerning 
the economics of SMRs (5); and, ii) the indigenous market in nuclear-capable nations (e.g. China, USA) 
may be a barrier to UK exports. The key opportunity for the UK is to be amongst the first providers to 
the international market in delivering an SMR product, which will maximise the economic benefit in 
terms of employment and revenue.   Alternatively, the UK may exploit the opportunity of the global 
market, at lower risk, by creating saleable intellectual property or providing services such as licencing, 
operations, and fuel design, fabrication, management and recycle. 
Research and development on SMRs  
8. At present, there is a lack of clarity concerning the objectives of the national strategy, and overall 
economic advantage, of SMRs, which Government should address.  If the opportunity is development 
and export of a UK SMR design, then considerably more investment will undoubtedly be required for 
technology development and demonstration, and creation of a supply chain. 
Development of Gen IV technology 
9. There should be strong involvement and leadership of technology development, if Gen IV 
technology can be demonstrated to be essential for operation of a sustainable UK fuel cycle, or the 
foreseeable export opportunities are plausible.  Arguably, the current evidence in support of both 
drivers is weak, given that disposition of the current plutonium stockpile via a Gen IV sodium cooled 
fast reactor has not been shown to be a compelling option.  
10. In the absence of clear strategic policy drivers, Government should ensure: i) that there are no 
barriers to UK innovation related to Gen IV technology or the partnership of historic UK strengths in 
high temperature gas cooled reactors and sodium cooled fast reactors with current international 
projects; and ii) research is primarily focused on generic issues which underpin more than one specific 
technology, including the participation in test reactor development. 
Remit and role of the National Nuclear Laboratory  
11. Overall, NNL can be considered to making a positive contribution to overall UK strategy and 
research effort, together with other public and private sector organisations.  However, there is an 
obvious tension between the public, commercial, and beneficiary role of NNL in nuclear fission 
research, and potential conflict with its stewardship role, which would be worthy of review.  
12. Evidence presented to a previous inquiry highlighted the need to provide greater access to enable 
access to the national research infrastructure managed by NNL.3  Progress has been made on this 
issue, however, much more needs to be done in order to meet the demand of high quality research 
ambition.   Access to facilities at the EC Joint Research Centre and US National Labs has proven more 
straightforward, in my experience, and has delivered timely and quality research outcomes.  
13. As highlighted above (11), NNL is well placed to deliver a substantial proportion of research ǯǤEffective partnership with other organisations 
should be strengthened and nurtured to deliver some aspects of its role, in terms of engaging expertise 
and facilities, for example in waste management technology.  
Funding and governance of the National Nuclear Laboratory  
14. The remit of the NNL is suitable to provide research and development support to the UK nuclear 
sector.  The strong resonance of the strategic remit with the £250M national research programme, 
should ensure that NNL is well placed to secure substantial funding, in addition to its commercial 
business, without the need for additional intervention.  
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15. In terms of governance, extending the length of the NNL management contract (e.g. 10 years, 
consistent with National Physical Laboratory) should enable the organisation to develop its 
infrastructure and strategy to deliver longer term research objectives, as previously recommended.3  
Oversight of the whole nuclear R&D landscape  
16. Over the last three years, NIRAB has exerted the only effective oversight over the whole nuclear 
R&D landscape, as far as its remit permitted, as set out in 17-20.  This ended with its term of office. 
Nuclear Research & Innovation Advisory Board and its successor 
17. With respect to the remit of NIRAB, as set by Government, it must be considered as highly effective 
in delivering its role.  Examples include: development of an integrated national innovation 
programme, and allied business case; timely advice presented to Minsters on Small Modular Reactors; 
and facilitating investment in research infrastructure realised by in-year expenditure opportunities, 
which have already had a transformative positive impact on UK research, as summarised in the UK 
Civil Nuclear R&D Landscape Survey 2017.4  As an example: investment of £800k by DECC in the 
MIDAS Facility at The University of Sheffield has supported of a research portfolio in excess of £15M, 
with grant awards to use the facility in excess of £8M.4 
19. Co-operation and co-ordination of government, public and private sector organisations, was very 
effectively facilitated by NIRAB, through Board and sub-group meetings, enabling research plans and 
priorities to be shared and effectively targeted.  An important example, is co-ordination of capital 
facilities expenditure planned through direct DECC grants, the Henry Royce Institute, and National 
Nuclear Users Facility. It would be highly beneficial to maintain such a forum for communication in 
any future Governance arrangements.  
20. Fundamental to the success of NIRAB, was an independent, authoritative, and influential Chair and 
Secretariat.  It is highly desirable that in future Governance arrangements, the position of NIRO as an 
independent Secretariat, with no conceivable conflict of interest, should be preserved. 
21. A successor body to NIRAB is certainly justified and desirable, the risk of not constituting such a 
body would be disintegration of the research landscape, adversely impacting research outcomes and 
benefits. The NIRAB approach to co-ordination was successful and could continue to be effective either 
as a time-limited or permanent successor body. Voluntary participation of members on NIRAB proved 
effective in managing commercial interests which might be difficult for paid appointment.   
22. A successor body to NIRAB would require adjustment of remit, to reflect the shift in focus from 
defining to delivering the national research programme. The key function should address the need for 
co-ordination of nuclear research strategy, with a view to advising Government on shaping publicly 
funded research to ensure that near and long term policy objectives are realised, including 
international collaboration.  The body could be tasked with oversight of the quality and impact of 
outcomes from the BEIS sponsored national programme, but this would need to be carefully tensioned 
against the strategic advisory role.  The constitution of the body should ensure that leading research 
organisations are engaged, appropriate to the scale of its remit.  In order that co-ordination can be 
effectively managed, this could be achieved with greater use of focused sub-groups.   
23. Irrespective of the nature and remit of the successor body, the need for independence cannot be 
over emphasised; the body should therefore be commissioned by Government, not a third party. 
21. Notwithstanding the success in development and funding of the national research programme (17-
20), two areas are highlighted for improvement.  First, enhanced prioritisation and co-ordination of 
international engagement activities is required, both to deliver research objectives and as a route to 
the global market.  Second, the recommended prioritisation the national research programme is 
focused on rather near term and commercially driven objectives, to the detriment of a fully integrated 
approach in some areas.  For example, the recommended balance of research resource allocated to  
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waste management versus fuel recycle (which will generate future higher activity wastes, that are 
outside the remit of NDA), may not be sufficient to fully underpin delivery of future fuel cycle 
scenarios Ȃ see Figure 1. 5  Whilst it can reasonably argued that early revenue generating research 
opportunities should be prioritised, the risk of not pursuing a proportionate waste management 
technology programme is an escalation in final clean-up costs which fall to the tax payer.  
 
Figure 1: Prioritisation of recycle and waste management R&D from NIRAB 124-1 (with permission).5 
Exiting the European Union 
28. The following additional issues are highlighted due to relevance and timeliness: exiting the 
European Union and plutonium management.   
31. UK nuclear research and innovation programme is at risk of disproportionate adverse impact 
arising from the leaving the EU due to close collaboration on, and integration of, strategic research 
priorities and facilities.  The EC Joint Research Centre, at Karlsruhe, provides access to research 
infrastructure not available or accessible in the UK - and which is unlikely to be available in the next 
decade (e.g. research with weighable quantities of plutonium-238).  Research in the UK is at risk of 
being curtailed in its ambition and significance if access to the EC JRC is not maintained. 
32. The UK has a respected and influential role in the two relevant EU technology platforms (IGDTP 
and SNETP), ensuring that research is well aligned with our national needs.  Leverage of the financial 
resources, expertise, facilities and expertise associated with EU framework and Horizon 2020 ǡǯ in geological disposal of 
radioactive wastes, such as the CAST and REDUPP consortia projects. 
33. Whilst Government has provided welcome assurance that financial commitments to existing 
Horizon 2020 projects will continue after leaving the EU, there is an urgent need to address the 
uncertainty of funding future UK engagement in EU nuclear research projects and access to facilities.  
Plutonium management 
34. Government policy is that any remaining plutonium which is not converted into MOX fuel, or 
otherwise reused, will be immobilised and treated as waste for disposal.6  Since commitment to this 
policy in 2013, the technical maturity of the MOX fuel option has been called into question, given that 
the US MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility  is heavily delayed and over budget.7  A review of the credible 
options for plutonium management would seem appropriate and timely, in particular, to ensure 
stockpile immobilisation is technically underpinned, should this be required. 
24 February 2017. 
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